After almost two months of tense ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) opened fire on Gaza Strip targets in the early hours of Tuesday, March 18th, signalling that the delicate truce had come to an end.
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu told his people it was necessary to “act decisively” against Hamas terrorists for their refusal to release the remaining hostages. Western media was quick to report that Netanyahu broke the ceasefire with the airstrikes. But the negotiations underpinning the truce had come to a dead end, and not because of Israel.
Knowing perfectly well that the withdrawal of Israeli forces from key chokepoints could never take place before all hostages were home, Hamas still refused to release any more—many of whom could be dead but are only useful to the terrorists as long as Israel thinks they are still alive.
As usual, much of the media repeated Hamas’ claims about the death toll from Israeli air-strikes without serious scrutiny, simply reporting that the Hamas-run Gaza Ministry of Health said over 400 people died in the latest attack. It is also rare for such reports to point out that Hamas never reveals how many of these alleged victims were combatants, and how many civilians, since the Islamists celebrate all these deaths as “martyrs.”
Let’s remember that, throughout the ceasefire, Netanyahu proved he was not only willing to negotiate in good faith but also to do whatever it takes to bring home the hostages. In the last 42 days, Israel released nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners—combatants and terrorists, some of whom even took part in the October 7th massacre—in exchange for 25 living hostages and eight bodies.
Israel also allowed hundreds of lorries carrying aid and food inside Gaza every day, let displaced Palestinians return to their neighborhoods, and withdrew its troops from all the populated areas as well as the Netzarim Corridor that separates the northern and southern halves of the strip.
What remained under IDF control were the border areas, including the southern Philadelphi Corridor along the Egyptian border. Giving up these would have meant leaving Israel in the dark while Hamas gears up for another attack. The now-canceled second stage of the ceasefire did envisage a complete withdrawal in exchange for all remaining hostages—but Hamas never showed a willingness to take the next steps.
Netanyahu rightly sees that there would be no lasting peace for either side as long as Hamas is left in charge of Gaza. However, while making tough but necessary decisions, Netanyahu is now facing growing internal battles as well.
From October 2023 to May 2024, the Israeli president’s popularity fell from 66% to 45%, according to the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI). Other state institutions have also seen declining approval: the IDF from 88% to 80%, the police from 47% to 42.5%, the media from 37% to 26%, and political parties from 21% to 9%. Trust in the Israeli system has plummeted, although as Tamar Hermann, a senior researcher at IDI, noted this is something happening throughout the rest of the West.
In a televised speech, Natenyahu stated that “We will continue fighting so that Gaza will no longer pose a threat to Israel,” after receiving “the security establishment’s recommendation to resume fighting.
Short-term peace options do not exist. “From now on, negotiations will only take place under fire,” the prime minister stated, adding, “Our commitment is to release both the hostages and to return the bodies of those murdered.” He leaned on his key ally, the United States, to reinforce his stance: “While Israel accepted the offer of President Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, Hamas flatly refused to do so.”
On the previous night, it was reported that the U.S. Navy had a convoy with two aircraft carriers near Yemen and that the Houthis fired on two of its ships. Tehran, in turn, has also placed its navy on high alert in its waters.
Tel Aviv faces what the Israeli military establishment calls “the seven fronts“: Hamas in Gaza and the West Bank, Shia forces in Syria and Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iran. The Shia Islamic regime controls all the other groups like its tentacles in the region, and for now, Israel is directly battling two of them: Hezbollah and Hamas.
While this situation is well understood politically within the Jewish state, the country’s political and social situation follows a different path. Or as the saying goes, “Two Jews, three opinions.” Aligning all interests is difficult, even when everyone is moving in the same direction.
The hostage and Gaza crisis has heated the pot too much over the past year and a half, and there is a risk it could explode in Netanyahu’s hands. On one side, the left and liberals have not forgotten the attempts at judicial reform before October 7th; on another, the left (both Arab and Israeli) calls for an end to hostilities for humanitarian and cultural reasons, given the affinities between Muslims on both sides of the border. Finally, assorted voices across the political spectrum want the hostages back as soon as possible and consider the continuation of hostilities a mistake, fearing that it may result in the hostages being returned in body bags.
As if this were not enough, Likud is struggling to approve the general budget before the end of the month, with resumption of the conflict offering little help. If no agreement is reached, elections will be called. Political criticisms are often more sensitive: Israel’s security is one of the red lines that cannot be crossed. Harm one Jew, and you harm them all.
This was evident when Otzma Yehudit’s Ben Gvir left the governing coalition after the ceasefire was signed. Likud suffered the consequences. Some off-the-record rumors suggest that for Netanyahu’s allies to return, it was necessary to attack Hamas again. War for budgets. Politics.
I met with several politicians at the Knesset (Israel’s parliament) in Tel Aviv. They speak with frankness and determination, though the Arab-Israeli Mansour Abbas from the Ra’am party is the most cautious, lamenting ”the war will only increase hatred among parties and will solve nothing.”
Abbas and his party support the Egyptian approach: returning everyone to their territories and having other forces manage Gaza. With more than 1,200 Israeli deaths to date, it seems impossible that Netanyahu would accept such a proposal—and nor would the Israeli people.
Even Abbas, however, points out something rarely heard in international circles, which tend to criticize Tel Aviv and Jerusalem:
The State of Israel was created to be a Jewish state, and if anyone thinks it can absorb five million Palestinians along with the two million already residing here, we would be talking about the end of a Jewish and democratic state.
These are devastating words for the international community—an Arab acknowledging Israel’s ethno-religious identity and rejecting the absorption of millions of Palestinians because it would cease to be both Jewish and democratic.
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sharren Haskel (New Hope), despite having a similar sensitivity—having left Likud to oppose Netanyahu in search of new leadership—has not hesitated to close ranks with the current government to confront Hamas. “We cannot allow international funds to continue financing terrorists,” she says. “European Union money also reaches Hamas, and it is time to say enough.” October 7th changed everything. As we reported earlier, it led to a shift in general public sentiment, and no one doubts that it will result in a functional reorganization of the state.
Such reform’s impact could be seen last weekend. Netanyahu dismissed Shin Bet (Israel’s intelligence services) chief Ronen Bar amid accusations of security failures before Hamas attacks. For now, Likud, Netanyahu’s party, shows no signs of fractures or weakness. National MP Boaz Bismuth is clear: “To achieve peace, we must win the war.” His speech is ironic and biting. It could be offensive to those unwilling to hear words that would never be uttered in EU political circles today, where everyone treads carefully when discussing conflict. Bismuth jumps straight in at the deep end. The left may not approve of the style, but posturing does not matter when thousands of rockets from Gaza or hypersonic missiles are fired at you. First, we win, then we talk.
Outside the Knesset, the distant shouts of protesters waving yellow flags can be heard, as can the yellow ribbons adorning the lapels of many politicians’ suits and hanging across the country. Their motivation is not necessarily political—at least not explicitly. They just want the hostages back, and they want them now. In the meantime, news arrives of Houthi missile launches. Most likely, they want to distract the IDF from Gaza or disrupt military operations. I am informed that “the missile shield has shot it down in Israeli airspace”.
The sun slowly fades and night falls. At the Western Wall plaza, groups of ultra-Orthodox children wait for their parents as they pray against the wall. Women were separated on the other side. The murmurs of prayers blend with loudspeakers calling for the Maghrib (the fourth Muslim prayer after sunset) and music whose source is impossible to identify.
The view exiting the plaza is breathtaking. A sky painted in deep blue, purple, and black, stained only by the intense lights of street lamps and the windows of clustered houses that cover the hills stretching into infinity. Judea and Samaria—another piece of the conflict—an eternal conflict for the eternal city in the Middle East.
