In the world of humanitarian aid, governments often entrust NGOs with millions in taxpayer funds, expecting them to act with integrity and transparency, especially in conflict zones. However, recurring instances of aid diversion by terrorist organizations should spur government action to ensure that their assistance is not diverted to these actors in places like Lebanon, Gaza, and Yemen.
Donor governments, including the United States—now and under the incoming Trump administration— must improve vetting processes to identify terror-linked and terror-supporting actors and their partners, and deny them taxpayer funds and materials. Unfortunately, international aid agencies work to undermine this goal.
The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)—which receives substantial funding from Western governments, including from the United States, UK, and Germany—demonstrates the extent of NGO opposition to anti-terror vetting.
In the recent conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, during which the Lebanese-based terrorist organization bombarded Israeli civilians with rocket and drone attacks for more than a year before a ceasefire was reached in November, NRC distributed cash aid in Hezbollah’s stronghold of southern Lebanon. Even amid the current ceasefire, the lack of proper oversight allows such funds and resources to flow freely, raising the risk that they will be diverted to Hezbollah operatives rather than civilian relief. Similarly, NRC has distributed cash in Gaza during the current war.
Despite concerns regarding aid diversion, NRC staunchly opposes vetting of its beneficiaries for terror ties, and at a December 2020 conference, NRC Secretary-General Jan Egeland demanded “Exemptions from counter-terrorism laws and sanctions regimes … We need blanket humanitarian exemptions.” He added, “We need you to champion that there will be no vetting of the ultimate beneficiaries of humanitarian relief.” Likewise, an NRC toolkit states that it will engage with armed groups, including terrorists, in order to gain access to vulnerable populations. This not only ignores serious security implications but invites exploitation by terrorists who can divert aid to support their operations—thereby compromising humanitarian efforts.
The UN’s World Food Programme (WFP)—funded by the U.S. and others for its work in conflict regions, including Lebanon—has taken a similar approach, declaring that “no matter what else is happening in any country—political, military or otherwise—[our] vital humanitarian operations are run independently of any other consideration.” Such disregard for anti-terror vetting clearly raises the risk of aid diversion.
As a powerful political organization, NRC has lobbied the US government for policy changes, augmenting its public advocacy. In 2020, the organization successfully pressured USAID to loosen anti-terror vetting requirements, advocating for exemptions that would allow humanitarian groups to bypass essential checks that protect against aid abuse by NGOs that have engaged with US-designated terrorist organizations, and by terror-supporting groups.
In a 2023 publication, NRC even described methods for NGOs to avoid U.S. scrutiny by using non-dollar transactions, in order to sidestepcounter-terrorism and anti-corruption regulations. These actions are an alarming breach of trust.
The U.S. has also introduced additional and dangerous loopholes that almost guarantee aid diversion. For instance, despite reinstating sanctions against the Houthi terrorist group in Yemen in January, the U.S. has made exceptions for aid groups to work with the Houthis. These exemptions allow U.S.-funded NGOs to continue to coordinate aid distribution with Houthi authorities, and even make payments to Houthi officials and Houthi-controlled entities, as long as they are for “taxes,” “administrative fees,”or other supposedly humanitarian reasons. These exemptions are ongoing despite combat between U.S. forces and Houthi terrorists, Houthi attacks on global shipping, and missile and drone strikes on Israeli cities.
European governments are often even more haphazard in their anti-terror prevention policies. Notably, the hurried decision by European countries to reinstate funding to UNRWA, despite overwhelming evidence of Hamas infiltration and of the agency and the role of its personnel in the October 7th massacre, is illustrative. Meanwhile, Hamas continues to commandeer international aid to Gaza, where the terror group maintains warehouses of food and other humanitarian supplies—at the expense of the civilian population.
The combination of insufficient government scrutiny, NGO and UN opposition to anti-terror vetting, and diversion schemes implemented by terrorist organizations creates an environment that makes this diversion a certainty. To prevent taxpayer funds from bolstering murderous terrorist groups, governments and their UN and NGO partners must implement rigorous vetting of aid recipients and of aid distributors, demanding transparency and accountability. Failure to do so strengthens dangerous actors that target civilians and harm global security. This is true now, as conflict continues in Lebanon, Yemen, and Gaza; and it will become even more pertinent as reconstruction efforts are launched when fighting has abated.
