For decades, European countries have neglected their defence capabilities and outsourced them to the United States. Even the United Kingdom, which has the strongest armed forces in Europe, only has around 150 deployable tanks and perhaps a dozen serviceable long-range artillery pieces. France, the number two, has fewer than 90 heavy artillery pieces, roughly equivalent to what Russia loses every month on the Ukraine battlefield. Denmark does not possess heavy artillery, submarines, or air defence systems. Germany’s army has sufficient ammunition for two days of battle.
Belgium, which spends a mere 1.3% of its GDP on defence, has no tanks or anti-aircraft artillery, which is necessary to protect the port of Antwerp, for example. Fortunately, things are improving with the new Belgian government. The Netherlands is now meeting the NATO standard of 2%, but only after years of neglecting its armed forces.
Europe has thus sidelined itself. Nevertheless, many European leaders are outraged that Trump has barely involved them, if at all, in the negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. Pure hypocrisy.
It is a good thing, however, that the situation has finally woken up European governments. Germany in particular will now fully invest in its own defence again. ‘Whatever it takes’ is the creed of Friedrich Merz, the likely new chancellor. Whether that should justify abandoning part of the fiscal discipline that has backed up Germany’s creditworthiness is a different question.
Even if one were to support the idea of new jointly issued European debt, it’s important to first consider the substantial resources already available within the European budget, for example, the €367 billion allocated for climate-related spending. Hardly anyone is talking about this.
The EU Commission’s plan foresees €150 billion in favourable loans and relaxation of EU budget rules. For around twenty EU member states, an EU loan is attractive, as borrowing independently would incur higher interest rates. Moreover, they will have 45 years to pay back the EU loan.
Still, that is not enough for some. France and Greece, among others, would prefer to see Brussels borrow money to then distribute as gifts—never mind that a loan at an artificially low interest rate already amounts to a gift, economically speaking. Slovenia and Spanish socialist prime minister Pedro Sánchez go even further and want to use the cash to ‘defend’ themselves against climate change. Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, in turn, wants to spend the money on border control.
Another problem is that EU Commission officials now see a chance to take advantage of the situation as they push for another round of common European debt according to the principle ‘Never waste a good crisis.’ They are being supported in this endeavour by the EPP Group.
Dutch daily De Telegraaf notes that “In the headquarters of the bureaucrats they already call the financing plan a ‘starting shot’” as the Commission’s defence plan contains a paragraph foreseeing that if “if the demand from Member States for loan financing exceeds the supply, the Commission will continue to look for innovative instruments.” The latter includes the European Stability Mechanism, one of the bailout funds used during the euro crisis. The clear hope is that it will help those who control the financing—Eurocrats—to also acquire control over defence policy. Hopefully, not much explanation is needed for why trusting something as sensitive as defence matters to a supranational bureaucracy is a terrible idea. National politicians already have a difficult time justifying the tricky trade-offs that come with this.
Clearly, using the necessary defence investment round as a pretext for accumulating more debt, centralising power, or increasing climate spending is not the optimal approach to strengthening defence capabilities. European politicians will probably not even need to explain to electorates that it is either guns or butter. There are ample opportunities to find savings in Europe’s bloated welfare states, making it entirely feasible to find the resources to strengthen the military.
Belgium is a case in point: It has one of Europe’s most generous welfare states, with 25% of GDP going to social security—up from 15% in 1970. Its defence spending has gone down from around 3% then to 1.3% today. Surely, the NATO target of 2% is doable, and the new Belgian government is dedicated to it.
Even if one were to think the United States will abandon its current allies, the reality is that Europe is currently in a weak position, militarily. Therefore, it would not be wise to throw away old shoes before having bought new ones.
Europe also has an influence on the question of whether America will abandon it. For Europe—which also includes the UK—it is key to remember that a genuine alliance is one between equals. This is why it is of the utmost importance to supporters of the Transatlantic Alliance that European countries take their own defences seriously again so that the United States also has something to gain from NATO.
